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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DARFEL.L J. DIDERICKSEN & 
SONS, INC., a Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
MAGNA WATER & SEWER 
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT, 
Defendant, Third-Party : 
Plaintiff and Appellant,: 
vs. 





TEMPLETON, LINKE & ASSOCIATES, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 
STATE~1ENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a construction contract for 
the relocation of the Magna Water and Sewer Improvement 
District's sewer line adjacent to 2400 South, from 7200 
West to approximately 8900 West, Magna, Utah. 
Respondent (hereinafter Contractor) claimed 
defendant Magna Water and Sewer Improvement District 
(hereinafter Magna) breached the contract by failure to 
recognize changed conditions and failure to pay progress 
payments timely. Magna counterclaimed for breach of 
contract for failure of Contractor to complete the work 
and sought recovery of its additional costs. 
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Appellant Magna named the Utah State Department of 
Transportation (hereinafter DOT) and its engineers as~. 
l,r; 
party defendants. 
The trial court granted judgment for Contractor. 
Magna and DOT, the party that has the ultimate financial 
responsibility, joined in appealing from the judgment. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake ~w 
the Honorable Jay E. Banks presiding, awarded Contractor a 
judgment against Magna for the sum of $24,969.00, represen-
ting the amount earned but unpaid at the time Contractor 
ceased operations. The Court further ruled that Contractor 
failed to prove its right to anticipated profits. The tri' 
court held that Magna's failure to approve change orders 
and to pay the Contractor's estimates as set forth in the 
contract constituted a breach thereof. Magna and DOT moved 
the court for a new trial, and after the matter was argued 
before the court on two occasions and memorandums submitted 
the court denied their motion. 
Due to Contractor's failure to prove its anticipate; 
profits, the claims of Magna against the Third-Party Def~ 
dant Templeton, Linke and Associates were dismissed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Magna seeks a reversal of the judgment in favor ~ 
Contractor for $24, 969. 00, and in lieu thereof a judgment 
in the sum of $71,066.60 on Magna's counterclaim. 
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Said amount represents the additional costs incurred by 
Magna to complete the sewer relocation project. 
In the alternative Magna seeks a new trial with 
instructions to the trial court on the proper method of 
ascertaining damages. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Contractor entered into a contract with Magna 
on September 23, 1975, to relocate Magna's sewer line 
along 2400 South, west of 7200 West, to accommodate con-
struction of a new four-lane State highway, which was being 
constructed by DOT. 
DOT had entered into an agreement with Magna 
for the reimbursement of all costs incurred by Magna for 
the sewer line relocation project. 
Said agreement provided that DOT would reimburse 
Magna within 60 days after receipt of itemized bills cover-
ing the costs incurred by Magna for performing the work 
required under the terms of the agreement. The contract 
between Magna and Contractor stated that Magna would make 
progress payments on the 15th day of each month to Con-
tractor provided Contractor submitted its estimate not 
later than the 1st day of the month. The Contractor's 
first periodic estimate for partial payment was submitted 
after November 7, 1975, in the sum of $22,744.32 (Exh. 
3-P, TT., P. 21-22) Contractor submitted a second peri-
odic estimate for partial payment after December 5, 1975, 
-3-
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in the sum of $54,380.46. (Exh. 4-P, TT, P. 23) Th2 Con. 
tractor submitted its third periodic t" f es im2te or p:irtia] 
payment sometime in January of 1976, for po.yTT>ent in the 
Slliil of $18,640.15. (Exh. 5-P, TT, P. 24-25) 
On January 27, 1976, Magna paid Contract"lr the 
S"!l1 of $22,744.32 C t ' f" ~ on on ractor s irst estimate aad on 
February 6, 1976, paid the s1.1.i-n of $54, 386. 46 on Contractor 
second estimate. i'.fo further payments have been pclid to 
Contractor by Magna. 
A pre-construction conference was held on the ~ 
day of September, 1975, at the offices of Templeton, Linke 
& Associates. At said conference Contractor was advised 
that W. W. Clyde Construction Company would cmmnence work 
on a new highway along 2400 South in conjunction with the 
construction of the sewer line. 
Contractor, Magna' s engineers, and representath 
of DOT met at 8400 West 2400 South, l1agna, Utah, on Sep-
tember 30, 1975, to discuss the problems that might occur 
in constructing the sewer line in that area. (TT, P. 270) 
On that date, representatives of DOT and Magna' s engineer': 
suggested that Contractor commence construction at 8400 
West and proceed west in order to avoid additional expense 
to Contractor by reason of having to restore work comp~~ 
by the highway contractor.(TT. P. 271) 
Contractor advised representatives of DOT and 
Magna on that date that it would not commence work west of 
8400 West without a change order. (TT, P. 37) Contractor 
further advised that it had planned to do \mrk west of 
-4-
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8400 West in the winter time when the ground was frozen. 
(TT, P. 107) 
Contractor failed to determine prior to bidding, 
that the pasture areas west of 8400 West do not freeze 
because of the alkalinity or salinity content of the ground. 
(TT I P. 305) 
Contractor was advised that a change order was 
not necessary and that Contractor could proceed in the 
8400 West area without a change order. Any of the changes 
in alignment of the sewer line, or additions and deletions 
to the construction plans, would be covered in the unit 
price contract that existed between Magna and Contractor. 
Consequently, Contractor would have been reimbursed for 
any expenses incurred as a result of any such changes. 
In order to allow Contractor to commence work 
at 8400 West, DOT ordered the highway contractor not to 
work in that area so that Contractor could complete his 
work prior to the road construction project. (Exh. 36-D, 
TT. I P. 231) 
Despite the steps taken by Magna and DOT to 
avoid conflicts between the sewer project and the highway 
project, Contractor commenced construction first on the 
east end of the sewer line and, thereafter, the highway 
contractor proceeded with road construction near the 
west end of the sewer relocation project. 
The plans and specifications for the sewer line 
required that the line be constructed through the Ritter 
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Canal. The plans and specifications for construction of 
the highway required the temporary relocation of the R" ltter 
Canal and construction of a box culvert to accoI'lmodate the 
canal. 
\J. W. Clyde and Contractor were to coordinate 
their work at the Ritter Canal so as to avoid additional 
costs to Contractor. Max Fuller of DOT had arranged a time 
when Contractor could construct the sewer line before w. H. 
Clyde Construction Company constructed the box culvert for 
the Ritter Canal, but Contractor failed to install the sewer 
line on schedule. (TT, P. 123) 
Contractor constructed the sewer line from 7200 
West to a manhole immediately east of the Ritter Canal at 
approximately 8200 West. At that point Contractor refused 
to proceed further without a change order. 
As a result of Contractor's refusal to complete 
the contract, Magna, after public bidding, awarded a con-
tract to Jay Tuft Construction Company (hereinafter Tuft) 
for the completion of the sewer line. Tuft completed the 
work for the total sum of $167,443.32. 
A major problem as perceived by the Contractor, 
augering under the Ritter Canal, was proven to be unnecessar 
Tuft merely excavated on both sides of the culvert with a 
backhoe and laid the pipe in one day. (TT, P. 255) 
Contractor, in bidding the project, had planned 
to divert the flow of the canal and construct a line 
through the canal bed, and then redivert the flow over 
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the constructed line and proceed from that point. (TT., P. 327) 
Contractor's plan to divert and redivert the Ritter Canal 
would have taken three to four days, but as a result of the 
box culvert being installed, the contractor would have con-
structed the sewer line in one day and thus benefited finan-
cially by its error in judgment. (TT., P. 328) 
ARGID1ENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING TP.AT CONSTRUCTION 
COULD NOT BE COMPLETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
THE CONTRACT BECAUSE OF HIGHWAY CONSTRUCTION 
IS ERRONEOUS. 
The trial court in its Finding of Fact No. V stated 
the following: 
"Because of the highway construction, 
construction of the sewer relocation project 
could not be completed in accordance with the 
terms and specifications of the contract 
entered into between plaintiff and defendant." 
Appellants assert that this finding is not supported 
by the record and is clearly in error. In fact, the sewer 
line project was completed by Tuft, substantially in 
accordance with the requirements of the original contract. 
Further, the agreement between Magna and Contractor 
was a unit price contract. Therefore, Contractor would 
have been compensated for additional work performed in 
re-routing any portion of the sewer line which might have 
conflicted with the highway construction work. 
Contractor seeks to excuse its failure to perform 
by claiming that the highway construction project prevented 
completion of the sewer line under the terms of the con-
tract. However, Contractor acted in bad faith by refusing 
- 7 -
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-to avail itself of an opportunity to avoid a conflict b 
commencing work first in the area west of 8400 l:Jest. 
time of the pre-construction f C con erence, ontractor was not,. 
fied of a possible conflict with a highway project and that 
a suspension order had been issued to the highway contracto• 
to permit Contractor to complete the sewer line in that are: 
first. Both Magna and DOT recommended to contractor that i: 
commence operations first at the 8400 West end of the projec 
The evidence indicates that Contractor had notice: 
other construction work in progress in that area even prior 
the pre-construction conference. James D. Didericksen t~L 
fied that his father informed him three days aftr~r the sewe: 
contract was executed that he observed another contractor~ 
cavating in the sewer project area. (TT., P. 35) 
The Supreme Court of Utah has held in a recent cas< 
that Contractors are generally charged with notice of anyoc 
tions which may be less than ideal for construction work, b1. 
which reasonably could have been anticipated. In L. A. Your 
Sons Construction Company v. County of Tooele, 575 P. 2d 
1034 (1978), the court stated: 
" . . . (O)ne who has contracted to perform a 
particular job for a stated price, if performance 
is possible, will not be excus~d from performance 
or entitled to extra compensation on account of 
encountering difficulties which have not been pro· 
vided against in the contract." 575 P.2 at 1037 
Magna should not be held to have guaranteed in 
the sewer line contract that Contractor would not encounter 
-8-
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any difficulties in the construction of the line. The 
accepted rule of law applicable herein is that performance 
is not excused by mere inconvenience, unpleasantness, 
or unfor2seen hardship or difficulties. 
The Supreme Court of Utah in Lowe v. Rosen~of, 
12 U.2d 190, 364 P.2d 418 (1961), held that a contractor, 
in order to recover under its contract, must establish 
its own performance or a valid excuse for its failure to 
perform. 
The only excuse alleged by Contractor for its 
failure to complete the line resulted from Contractor's 
own errors of judgment in evaluating the project. 
Contractor claimed it could not colllI!lence con-
struction at the 8400 West end prior to the highway crew 
because it had planned to work there in the winter when 
the marshy ground in the area would be frozen and would 
support the weight of its excavating equipment. 
Magna presented evidence at trial to the effect 
that the alkalinity and salinity of the soil in the marshy 
area in question prevented its freezing solidly even 
during severe winters. 
Further, Tuft completed the work in that area 
with little difficulty despite the softness of the ground. 
It must be noted the contract in question was 
between contractor and Magna, and that Magna did nothing 
to hinder performance by Contractor. The acts complained 
of and which Contractor alleges created a change of 
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conditions were the acts of an independent highway 
contractor and not those of Magna nor DOT. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT MAGNA'S FAILURE TO MAKE 
PROGRESS PAYMENTS STRICTLY WITHIN 
THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT DID NOT 
CONSTITUTE A BREACH AND RESPONDENT 
CONTRACTOR SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM 
CLAIMING A BREACH DUE TO ITS OWN 
ACTIONS. 
The trial court ruled that Magna's failure to 
make progress payments within the time limits of the 
contract was a breach which justified Contractor in 
terminating work on the project. 
The court, by so ruling, imposed a double 
standard. It held Magna to a different standard than that 
imposed on the Contractor in that Contractor failed to submi· 
its payment estimates in a timely manner, yet Magna was 
required to make payment strictly within the times 
established in the contract. 
A. MAGNA DID NOT BREACH ITS 
CONTRACT WITH CONTRACTOR BY 
FAILING TO MAKE PROGRESS PAY-
MENTS ON NOVEMBER 15 AND ON 
DECEMBER 15, 1975 
James Didericksen testified for Contractor that 
none of its three estimates were submitted to Templeton, 
Linke, engineers for Magna, for approval and certification 
prior to the first day of the calendar month following the 
month in which the work was performed as required by 
paragraph 25(a) of the Magna-Didericksen contract. 
) Mr. Didericksen testified that he was to~ (TT. , P. 120 
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by Robert Emerson of Templeton, Linke that he would receive 
p0ym2nt by the 15th of such calendar month if the estim~tes 
were submitted after the 1st of each month but prior to the 
date on which Magna's Board held its regular monthly meeting. 
Further, Didericksen testified that Emerson was of the 
opinion that such meetings occurred on approximately the 
12th day of the month. (TT. pp. 20-21) 
However, Didericksen testifed that during the 
first part of November, 1975 he first learned that DOT was 
making all payments and that the State's processing of the 
estimates would not be completed by the 15th of the month. 
(TT. pp.24-25) Contractor continued working during the 
remainder of November and December, 197~ with full know-
ledge of the actual manner in which progress payments 
would be made and that such payments could not be processed 
by the 15th of the month. Contractor also submitted two 
estimates after being so informed. Contractor accepted 
progress payments in January and February, 197~ without 
any reservation of its rights concerning the timeliness of 
the payments. 
B. CONTRACTOR WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO 
RECEIVE PROGRESS PAYMENTS BY 
THE lSTH DAY OF THE CALENDAR 
MONTH FOLLOWING THE MONTH FOR 
WHICH WORK HAD BEEN PERFORMED, 
contractor waived its right to receive progress 
payments strictly within the time limits established in 
the contract. A waiver has been defined as the 
1
'intentional 
1 . · h t of a known right" and may be either express re inquis men 
-11-
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or implieC.. 
61 P.2d 308, 311-312 (1936). See also, Bjork__y. April 
Industries, Inc., 547 P.2d 219 (1976). 
Based on the testiwony of James Didericksen, 
Contractor clearly waived any right to be paid by the 15th 
of the calendar month following the month in which it per-
formed work by continuing to work on the project, submittfo; 
additional estimates for work performed on the project, 
and accepting partial· payment for such work after learning 
during the first part of November, 1975 that progress pay-
ments would be paid in a different manner than set forth in 
the written contract. 
C. CONTRACTOR IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSERT-
ING THAT MAGNA BREACHED ITS CONTRACT 
BY FAILING TO MAKE PROGRESS PAYMENTS 
TO PLAINTIFF BY NOVEMBER 15 AND 
DECEMBER 15, 1975. 
In J. P. Koch v. J. C. Penney Company, Inc., 
534 P.2d 903 (1975), the Supreme Court of Utah defined 
estoppel as: 
" • • . (A) doctrine of equity to 
prevent one party from deluding or 
inducing another into a position 
where he will unjustly suffer loss 
. .The test is whether there 
was conduct, by act or omission, 
by which one party knowingly ~eads 
another party, reasonably acting 
thereon, to take some course of 
action which will result in his detrim~nt or damage if the first 
party is permitted to repudiate.or 11 
deny his conduct or representation. 
534 P.2d at 904-905 
-12-
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The doctrine of estoppel is applied independently 
of any contract or agreement between the parties, and 
thus, there is no requirement of consideration. In Larsen 
v. Knight, 120 U. 261, 233 P.2d 365, 372 (1951), the 
Supreme Court of Utah stated that a "par1y claiming a right 
ought not to appear to acquiesce in nonperformance by the 
other party until the time has gone by for such performance 
and then claim damages." 
In this case, Contractor continued performance of 
the contract for a period of approximately 45 days after 
learning that progress payments would not be made by the 
15th day of the month following the month for which work 
was performed. By reason of Contractor's conduct and 
acquiescence, Magna was induced to believe that progress 
payments could be made at a date later than that called for 
by the written contract without constituting a breach 
thereof. Contractor, having engaged in such conduct and 
having accepted two of the progress payments at dates 
later than that specified in the written contract, ought 
not to be permitted to claim that Magna breached the 
agreement by making the payments when it did. 
In the case of Wagstaff v. Remco, Inc., 540 P.2d 
931 (1975), the Supreme Court of Utah stated concerning 
delayed payments: 
" • • • (A) a mere delay of a month 
by a party in making a payment on a 
contract will usually result in 
damages only and will not justify 
the other parx in abandoning the 
contract ... 540 P.2d at 933 
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In \.J~s raff, supra, the court held that a 
contractor must complete construction unless the del'ty 
in payrnent affects its ability to continue uerforminu 
.. ,_J 
under the contract. In the instant case, Contractor 
clearly had the ability to continue Performance in view 
of the fact that it continued progress on the constructioo 
of the sewer line for some 45 days after learnin8 of the 
delay in progress payments. 
Contractor evinced no serious concern oveT dela~ 
in payment and made no objection Hhen informed by Hagna 
that payments would have to originate with DOT. In fact, 
this issue was not raised until after Contractor terminated 
operations, apparently as an afterthought, to justify termi· 
nating performance under the contract. 
POINT III 
RESPONDENT CONTRACTOR, AFTER ALLEGEDLY 
LEARNING OF VARIOUS OBSTACLES FOR. THE 
FIRST TIME, ELECTED TO PROCEED UNDER 
TEP.HS OF THE CONTRACT, AND ITS SUB-
SEQUENT SUSPENSION OF OPERATIONS WAS 
A BREACH THEREOF. 
Magna and DOT both urged the trial court to find 
that Contractor had breached its agreer.lent with Ma8na. The 
trial court rejected the argu.i-nents of the parties and vari· 
ous legal authorities in concluding that Contractor was 
justified in terminating operations. 
Contractor began construction at the east end 
d · the fact ,_·t had been informed of the sewer line espite 
of at the 8400 West end which would the highway project 
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be suspended to permit Contractor to complete its work 
in that area first. 
Further, Contractor refused to proceed further 
when it reached the Ritter Canal crossing, claiming that a 
box culvert installed at that point would necessitate 
augering under the culvert at great expense in order to 
proceed with the sewer line. Once again, Contractor's 
own error in judgment was claimed as an excuse for breach-
ing the agreement with Magna. The contractor who completed 
the project did so without having to auger at the Ritter 
Canal crossing. 
The evidence reveals that the alleged changed 
conditionsclaimed by Contractor as an excuse for refusing 
to complete performance were the product of Contractor's 
own errors and omissions and its refusal to cooperate with 
the suggestions by Magna and DOT to avoid conflicts with 
the highway project. 
Appellants submit that the case of Hurwitz~. 
David K. Richards Co., 20 U.2d 232, 436 P.2d 749 (1968), 
outlines three alternatives for one who claims that another 
party to a contract has breached the same. They are: 
(1) to rescind the contract; (2) to treat the contract 
as binding and wait for performance; or (3) to sue for 
damages. Concerning the first alternative, the Supreme 
Court of Utah stated in the case of Green v. Palfreyman, 
109 U. 291, 166 P.2d 215 (1946): 
-15-
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. " Forfei ~ures are not favored, and in 
interpreting an agreement, every reason-
abl~ presum~tion should be indulged 
against an intention to allow a for-
feiture." 166 P.2 at 219. 
In Jameson v. Wurtz, 396 P.2d 68 (1964), the 
Supreme Court of Alaska states: 
" ... (E)quity abhors forfeiture and 
will seize upon slight circumstances to 
relieve a party therefrom."396 P.2d at 
74 
The case of Schepf v. McNamara, 354 Mich. 393, 
93 N. W. 2d 320 (1958), involved a claim of breach of 
contract for hauling sand after the haul distance was 
increased. The Michigan Supreme Court stated: 
" By continuing thus to perform and 
to accept payments under it, as above 
noted, he lost his right, if any, to 
terminate the contract and declare it 
forfeited. 
It was appellant's duty, when it 
discovered the apparent breach of the 
contract, if it intended to insist upon 
a forfeiture, to do so at once. By 
permitting appellees to proceed with 
the performance of the contract it 
waived a breach. 
Where there has been a material breach 
which does not indicate an intention to 
repudiate the remainder of the contract, 
the injured party has a genuine election 
either of continuing performance or of 
ceasing to perform. Any act indicating 
an intent to continue will operate as a 
conclusive election, not indeed of 
depriving him of a right of action for 
the breach which has already taken place, 
but depriving him of any excuse for 
ceasing performance on his own part." 
Contractor herein allegedly did not know the 
highway contractor would be working in the project area 
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at the same time. However, between the time the Contractor 
submitted its bid on th 15th f o b e o cto er, 1975, Contractor 
became aware of the following facts: 
(1) There was ground water in the 
pasture area west of 8400 West; 
(2) There would be simultaneous highway 
construction in the immediate area 
of the project; 
(3) The highway contractor had commenced 
work and had begun excavating the 
drainage ditch on the western portion 
of the project, and Contractor knew 
this would result in a restricted 
working area; 
(4) A box culvert would be installed at 
the Ritter Canal crossing; 
(5) A box culvert would be installed 
at 8400 West; and 
(6) There would be a substantial need 
for coordination among the various 
contractors working on the project. 
The Contractor, having knowledge of the facts 
above enumerated and believing the same to constitute 
grounds for breach of contract, nevertheless elected to 
proceed, thus depriving it of any excuse for later ceasing 
performance. Contractor remained obligated to complete 
the job. It would still have had an opportunity to assert 
that it was damaged by reason of the alleged breach at the 
conclusion of the contract and could conceivably have 
recovered appropriate damages, if any. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S METHOD OF DETERMIN-
ING DAMAGES IS CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED 
LEGAL PRECEDENT. 
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The trial court ruled that Contractor failed to 
prove its claimed anticipated profits. Further, it 
determined that Contractor had earned the sum of $24 ,959.oo 
which had not been paid to Contractor by Magna. Appellants 
do not contest these rulings. Appellants contend, ho~vever, 
that the law of this State is well defined concerning the 
issue of damages in construction contract cases. In the 
recent case of Holman v. Sorensen, 556 P.2d 499 (1976), 
the Supreme Court of Utah found the construction site owner 
in breach of a construction contract. In its opinion,t~~ 
citing the earlier case of ICeller v. De~_e_ret Mortu_".:__£._Z_C~, 
23 U.2d 21, 455 P.2d 197 (1969), 3tated: 
"It is the undisputed law of this 
State and the general consensus of 
legal writers that breach of construc-
tion contract damages are based upon 
the total amount promised for the 
project, less the reasonable costs of 
completing it." 556 P. 2d at 500 
Kelle!:_, supra, contains a formula for the computa· 
tion of damages in construction contract cases approved 
by a unanimous court as follows: 
" Total con tract 
Paid by the defendant 
Balance if job had been 
completed 









455 P. 2d at 198 
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This formula was applied by the court in \'lagstaff 
v~emco, supra. In that case, the Court, based on disputed 
evidence, allowed an offset of $4,099.00 against the balance 
claimed by the plaintiff to be due and owing, constituting 
the difference between the total contract price and the 
amount paid by the owner. The result was a net judgment 
in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $4,064.94. 
The court in Wagstaff stated the following: 
"Notwithstanding the trial court's 
ruling that Remco had been guilty of 
breach for failing to make the large 
initial payment as set forth above, 
it also ruled, (and we do not disagree) 
that Remco was entitled to offset 
against Wagstaff's contract price, the 
amount of expenses reasonable and nec-
essary to complete the job." 540 P.2d 
at 933 
using the above described formula and substituting 
the applicable amounts as derived from the evidence in the 
instant case, results in the following determination : 
Total contract price 
for sewer relocation $198,476.50 
Less amount paid by Magna 
to Contractor - 77,130.78 
Amount available to 
complete project $121,345.72 
Maana's cost to complete 
project: 
Paid to Tuft $167,443.32 
Amount earned but 
unpaid to Contractor 24,969.00 
Less funds available to 
complete project 
Magna's total damages 
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71,066.60 
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Less off set for amount 
earned but unpaid to 
Contractor 
Magna's net damages 
$ 24,969.00 
$ 46,097.60 
The court ruled that Contractor failed to prove 
its damages as far as any anticipated profits. On the 
other side, the cost to Magna of com;:>leting the contract 
as well as the additional cost for work completed by the 
Contractor was established by the evidence. The result 
is that the trial court should have ruled on the busis of 
the evidence before it, which evidence was not challeng~ 
by the Contractor, that Magna was entitled to judgwent 
against Contractor since the reasonable cost of co;:ipletinJ 
the project exceeded the funds available under the original 
contract by an amount of $71,066.60. Further, Magna was 
entitled to retain as an offset against said sum the amount 
of $24,969.00 earned by but unpaid to Contractor, leaving 
net damages to Magna in the sum of $46,097.60. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing, Appellants request 
this court to reverse the judgment in favor of Contractor 
and grant judgment in favor of Magna, or in the alternative, 
to reverse and remand the case for a new trial with 
instructions as to the correct method of computing damages. 
DATED this~;!~~y of April, 1979. 
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